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SYMPOSIUM: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS




"Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy."1 Thus begins
George Fletcher's 1978 book, Rethinking Criminal Law ("Rethinking"), which is
the subject of this symposium conceived to mark and honor the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the book's initial publication. While it has become fairly common
for a symposium to honor the life work of a law scholar,3 symposia focusing on a
single book are surprisingly rare. And the few existing symposia on single books
typically occur contemporaneously with or shortly after the publication of the
book.4 Such symposia, then, function, we might say, as collections of book
reviews. This symposium affords an appreciably different focus. It allows, with
the passage of time, for not merely the standard predictions that such-and-such a
book "promises to shape the debate for years to come," but rather reflection on
the actual significance and influence the book has enjoyed. And very few books
have been as significant and influential in their field as Rethinking.
It is as difficult to overstate, as it is unnecessary to marshal evidence of, the
importance of Rethinking. Too many commentators before me have already sung
its praises. Bernard Jackson writes, "The integration of dogmatic, historical,
comparative and philosophical approaches to law has often been regarded as an
ideal of legal scholarship. Professor Fletcher's book comes closer than any other I
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law xix (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
2. Originally published by Little, Brown, and Co. in 1978, Rethinking was republished by Oxford
University Press in 2000.
3. See e.g. Symposium, Propter Honoris Respectum, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 677 (2003) (honoring
the scholarship of George Fletcher).
4. See e.g. Symposium, John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 486 (1973). For an
example of a symposium on a single book convened substantially after the date of publication, see
Symposium, Symposium on Rawlsian Theory of Justice: Recent Developments, 99 Ethics 695 (1989).
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know to the attainment of this ideal. . . ." A. T. H. Smith describes Rethinking as
"an almost indigestible supply of new ideas" and "so original in its conception that
it is difficult to characterise.",6 Herbert Fingarette terms it a "uniquely important
work." 7 Cole Durham, writing in 1979, hails Rethinking as the "most interesting
Anglo-American work on criminal law to appear in this decade.",8 And in this
symposium, Douglas Husak declares Rethinking to be "the most important book
in the English language about the philosophy of criminal law written in the past
century." 9
This admiration for Rethinking perhaps stems both from its uniqueness and
its success on so many different levels. First, while its 898 pages have the length
and comprehensiveness of a treatise or hornbook, Rethinking is more prescriptive
than descriptive. It is not content to summarize criminal law doctrine, but rather
seeks to explain, critique, challenge, and improve upon existing criminal law
doctrine. Second, it melds a wide array of interdisciplinary sources and
methodologies-history, moral philosophy, political philosophy, jurisprudence,
and comparative law-and brings them to bear on problems in the criminal law,
both theoretical and practical. Third, it may well be the first book ever written (at
least in the English language) on comparative criminal law. Fourth, while not the
first book on criminal theory, Rethinking cemented its viability as a legitimate and
invaluable subfield of criminal law. Fifth, at a time when "American criminal
lawyers [were] preoccupied with evidentiary and constitutional issues,"'
Rethinking sharpened interest in substantive criminal law. Sixth, in an era when
criminal law was dominated by the grip of consequentialism and the Model Penal
Code, Rethinking stemmed the prevailing tide by providing the necessary
counterpoint of a nonconsequentialist framework for understanding criminal
law." And seventh, in a recent study of "Most-Cited Legal Books," Rethinking
was the most-cited book on criminal law.12
The contributions to this symposium are as varied as the diverse sources and
methodologies utilized in Rethinking. They address a range of criminal law issues
from the perspectives of moral philosophy, political philosophy, history,
international law, and comparative law. The topics addressed include the theory
of crime legislation, subjective versus objective perspectives on mens rea,
5. Bernard S. Jackson, Towards an Integrated Approach to Criminal Law: Fletcher's Rethinking
Criminal Law, 1979 Crim. L. Rev. 621, 621 (book review).
6. A.T.H. Smith, Book Reviews: Rethinking Criminal Law, 39 Cambridge L.J. 382, 382 (1980).
7. Herbert Fingarette, Rethinking Criminal Law Excuses, 89 Yale L.J. 1002, 1002 (1980) (book
review).
8. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Book Review, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 629, 629.
9. Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, 755 (2004).
10. Smith, supra n. 6, at 382.
11. For further discussion, see George P. Fletcher, From Rethinking to Internationalizing Criminal
Law, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 979, 979-981, 986 (2004); Kyron Huigens, Fletcher's Rethinking: A Memoir, 39
Tulsa L. Rev. 803, 803-07 (2004); V.F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39
Tulsa L. Rev. 925, 928-29 (2004).
12. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 397, 400
(2000) (ranking Rethinking twenty-second on the list of most-cited legal books (other than
practitioner-oriented treatises and student texts)).
[Vol. 39:737
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normative versus descriptive views of fault and culpability, the offense/defense
distinction, the justification/excuse distinction, mistaken and unknowing
justification, self-defense, the politics of crime legislation, the problem of moral
luck, the possibility of a universal grammar or structure of criminal law, and
universal jurisdiction in international criminal law. As befitting the
interdisciplinary approach of Rethinking, the contributors are from the varied
fields of philosophy, jurisprudence, legal history, and, of course, criminal law.
And as befitting Rethinking as perhaps the first book on comparative criminal law,
nearly half of the contributions are from leading scholars from abroad-England,
Scotland, Argentina, Israel, Spain, and Germany.13
The contributions are organized into three main groupings. The first
grouping-the first eight essays-focus on various aspects of Rethinking. These
eight essays are arranged by topic in roughly the order in which Rethinking dealt
with those same topics. The second grouping of four essays share an affinity-
either methodological or topical-with Fletcher's forthcoming sequel to
Rethinking, tentatively titled Internationalizing Criminal Law. And finally is
Fletcher's own essay which takes a retrospective view of Rethinking as well as a
prospective glimpse of Internationalizing Criminal Law.
While gratified that some aspects of Rethinking have received considerable
attention, Fletcher laments the inattention paid to its taxonomy of patterns of
criminal liability.' 4  These patterns represent different approaches to, and
explanatory frameworks for, much of the doctrines, principles, and specific
offenses of criminal law. If the criminal law is conventionally divided into the
"Special Part," and the "General Part,"' 5 then this taxonomy of patterns of
criminal liability might represent the "Middle Part" by being neither one category
nor the other but falling somewhere in between." Presumably Fletcher will be
pleased that this imbalance of critical attention to the "Middle Part" is redressed,
in part, by two contributions to this symposium making it their primary focus-
"Crimes Outside the Core"' 7 by Douglas Husak and "Views on Fletcher's 'Two
Patterns of Criminality' ' ' 18 by Deborah Denno.
Fletcher's three patterns of criminal liability are manifest criminality,
subjective criminality, and harmful consequences. Under the pattern of manifest
criminality, "the commission of the crime [must] be objectively discernible at the
time that it occurs. The assumption is that a neutral third-party observer could
recognize the activity as criminal even if he had no special knowledge about the
13. Counting George Fletcher himself, who penned his contribution to this symposium while
teaching in Egypt and who might best be described by the travel agents who know him well as a citizen
of the world, exactly half of the contributions are from abroad.
14. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 985.
15. The terminology may have originated with Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part
(2d ed., Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1961).
16. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 987 (citing Winfried Hassemer, formerly a Professor of Criminal Law at
Frankfurt and now Vice President of the German Constitutional Court, for coining the term).
17. Husak, supra n. 9.
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offender's intention."' 9 Fletcher emphasizes two important features: (i) that a
crime has been committed "crystallizes as the product of community experience,
rather than being imposed on the community by an act of legislative will,"' and
(ii) the importance of an actor's intent or mens rea is secondary to, and dependent
on, establishing the manifest criminality of the actor's conduct.21 In contrast,
under the pattern of subjective criminality, "the core of criminal conduct is the
intention to violate a legally protected interest."22 Whether an actor's conduct is
manifestly criminal to the community is primarily of significance only as evidence
23of, or to corroborate, the existence of the actor's criminal intention or mens rea.
And finally, in the harmful consequences pattern of criminality, "the starting point
for analyzing liability is ... the occurrence of the harm itself; once the harm is
established, the inquiry centers on attributing that harm to particular actors and
assessing whether they are accountable for bringing it about., 24 While each of
these patterns is necessary for an adequate account of criminal law, the three
patterns are neither individually nor even jointly sufficient to explain all of the
significant criminal offenses. As such, they only "illuminate the core offenses of
the criminal law.,
25
Husak's essay explicates the significance of these three patterns of liability
by examining what it means for a crime to be within or without the so-called core
offenses encompassed by the three patterns of liability. Although Husak chides
Fletcher for paying inadequate attention to "issues of criminalization-a set of
principles that limit the scope of the criminal sanction,2 6 Husak construes the
patterns as supplying the much-needed conceptual tools for a theory of
criminalization-describing the sort of conduct that may justifiably be prohibited
and punished as criminal. Husak employs Fletcher's patterns in an attempt to
limit the justifiability of the explosive, ill-advised growth in the number of crimes
which Husak classifies as coming in three types: (i) overlapping or redundant
offenses, (ii) risk-prevention offenses, and (iii) ancillary offenses (those offenses
which supply a means of convicting a defendant of a related crime when there is
insufficient evidence to convict of a core crime). 27 By demonstrating that some
offenses of risk-prevention and all of the ancillary offenses fall outside Fletcher's
three patterns, Husak concludes that such offenses are without prima facie,
28justification. As a result, unless legislators can shoulder the burden of justifying
their criminalization, these offenses should be eliminated.29
19. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 115-16.
20. Id. at 116.
21. Id. at 117.
22. Id. at 118.
23. Id. at 118-19.
24. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 235.
25. Id. at 234.
26. Husak, supra n. 9, at 765.
27. Id. at 769-72.
28. Id. at 774-78.
29. Id. at 773.
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Denno bolsters Fletcher's subjective criminality pattern by critiquing a more
extreme view of the manifest criminality pattern espoused by recent
commentators. 30 The premise of this more extreme view is that courts are ill-
equipped to divine the actual content of the defendant's mental state.31 Instead,
courts should merely infer the requisite mental state from the actor's conduct or
presume it from doctrines such as an actor intends the natural and probable
consequences of her actions.32 After demonstrating the difficulties with this
extreme manifest criminality pattern, Denno buttresses the subjective criminality
pattern by canvassing the new advances in psychological research on
consciousness.33 While this new research supports the premise of the extreme
manifest criminality pattern concerning the near impossibility of divining an
actor's mental state (even for the actor herself34), it also reveals that mental states
are even more subtle and convoluted than previously realized. 3' And it is this very
subtlety that precludes the extreme manifest criminality pattern's ability to
reliably infer and presume an actor's mental state. Thus, paradoxically, because
the task of the subjective criminality pattern-discerning an actor's actual mental
state-is even more difficult, it is also that much more important for our
institutions of criminal justice to undertake. As a result, our increased
understanding of consciousness affords a clarification and modernization of
36Fletcher's subjective criminality pattern. Denno concludes that the preferable
pattern is a combined "subjective + manifest '37 pattern with the subjective
criminality component predominating.38
Though also ultimately focusing on mental states and culpability, Kyron
Huigens begins his contribution, "Fletcher's Rethinking: A Memoir, 39 with a
charmingly personal recollection of how Rethinking transformed both Huigens, as
a budding academic, and the field of criminal law. Huigens sketches the state of
criminal law scholarship prior to the publication of Rethinking as hopelessly
dominated by consequentialism and non-cognitivismY The "philosophical
boldness",41 of Rethinking, according to Huigens, derived from its firm
commitment to a "normative," or non-consequentialist perspective. 4' The
perception that Rethinking was distinctively "normative" Huigens traces to
30. Denno, supra n. 18, at 786 (citing Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll's Mental State or What Is Meant
by Intent, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 71, 99 (2001)).
31. Id. at 787-89.
32. Id. at 789-90.
33. Id. at 793-801.
34. Id. at 797.
35. See Denno, supra n. 18, at 793-98.
36. Id. at 800-01.
37. Id. at 783.
38. Id.
39. Huigens, supra n. 11.
40. Id. at 803-06.
41. Id. at 815.
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Rethinking's dichotomizing descriptive and normative approaches to culpability.43
The descriptive view of culpability, dominant at the time and influenced by the
Model Penal Code, was that culpability consisted of an actual mental state, for
example, an intent to commit a criminal act, residing in the mind of the
defendant.44 The role of the jury was then simply to determine as a matter of fact
whether the defendant did or did not have this requisite mental state. As Fletcher
pointed out, however, the descriptive view could not accommodate the culpability
standard of negligence, which is not a mental state at all. 45 A finding of negligence
required a jury to make a normative judgment as to whether the defendant
violated a standard of reasonableness. While noting the historical importance of
the distinction in both the development of the criminal law and his own
scholarship, Huigens now views the distinction as flawed and inadequate.46 After
proposing a more central distinction-intentional versus non-intentional fault 4 - -
Huigens illustrates the preferability of his distinction to Fletcher's by comparing
each distinction's application to the infamous English rape case, Regina v.
Morgan.45
In "Fletcher on Offences and Defences, 49 John Gardner defends and
extends Fletcher's argument in Rethinking of the central substantive importance
of the distinction between offenses and defenses. While some may maintain that
the distinction is inconsequential, useful to textbook writers as a classificatory
rubric, or of procedural significance in shifting burdens of persuasion between
prosecutors and defendants, Fletcher argues that it has substantive, moral
consequences in four areas.50 In drawing the distinction between offenses and
defenses, Fletcher posits that "[t]he minimal demand on the definition of an
offense is that it reflects a morally coherent norm... [such] that its violation is
incriminating."'" Fletcher cautions, however, that "this methodology may be
insufficiently precise to resolve 5 2 borderline cases and that there is no "abstract,
43. Id. at 804-05.
44. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 396-99.
45. Id. at 399-400, 493-94.
46. See Huigens, supra n. 11, at 807-08.
47. Id. at 809.
48. Id. at 809-15 (discussing Regina v. Morgan, 1976 App. Cas. 182).
49. John Gardner, Fletcher on Offences and Defences, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 817 (2004).
50. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 552-55. Fletcher explains the four areas as follows:
First, it is of critical importance in deciding when external facts, standing alone, should have
an exculpatory effect. Secondly, it might bear on the analysis of permissible vagueness in
legal norms. Thirdly, it might bear on the allocation of power between the legislature and
judiciary in the continuing development of the criminal law. And fourthly, it might be of
importance in analyzing the exculpatory effect of mistakes.
Id. at 555.
51. Id. at 567-68.
52. Id. at 568.
[Vol. 39:737
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logical test., 53 In a subsequent article, Fletcher notes that satisfactorily drawing
the distinction is the most significant "unmet challenge in criminal theory. 54
While paying tribute to Rethinking for establishing the importance of the
offense/defense distinction,5  Gardner attempts to more firmly establish what the
distinction turns on and to determine more precisely the respective domains of
offenses and defenses-that is, how do we determine what belongs in each
category? Gardner bases his delineation of the distinction on conceptualizing an
offense as the reasons that oppose committing the conduct (prohibited by the
offense) and defenses as those reasons which are in favor of committing the
conduct (prohibited by the offense). If the reasons against the conduct "stand
undefeated 56 by the reasons in favor, then the defendant is properly convicted.
But if the reasons in favor outweigh the reasons against, the defendant's defense
succeeds. Gardner then goes on to examine whether this solution is compatible
with Fletcher's views.
Perhaps the single issue on which Rethinking, as well as Fletcher's other
work, enjoys the most influence is the justification/excuse distinction." As we now
well know, a "justification speaks to the rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether
the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act."58 But prior to Rethinking
59and Fletcher's earlier discussions dating back as far as 1972, the distinction was
considered archaic, irrelevant, and properly relegated to the dustbin of history.
60
But within ten years after the publication of Rethinking, the distinction had been
the principle focus of two symposia,6 ' and in 1989 the distinction was hailed as
"[p]erhaps the single most significant and controversial research program among
53. Id. at 566.
54. George P. Fletcher, The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1439, 1443
(1987) ("The unmet challenge of criminal theory consists in working out the basis of the incriminating
dimension of crime and relating this incriminating dimension to the exculpatory dimension of
justification and excuse.").
55. Gardner, supra n. 49, at 817, 818.
56. Id. at 819.
57. While disappointed that some aspects of Rethinking have been neglected, Fletcher
acknowledges that "[t]here has been a lot of attention paid to the theory of justification and
excuse ...." Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 985.
58. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 759.
59. For perhaps Fletcher's first discussion of the distinction, albeit as applied to tort theory, see
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 558-59 (1972). For
Fletcher's other pre-Rethinking work on justification and excuse, see generally George P. Fletcher, The
Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 293 (1975) [hereinafter
Fletcher, Right Deed]; George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1269 (1974); George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in
Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 lsr. L. Rev. 367 (1973) [hereinafter Fletcher, Proportionality].
60. See e.g. H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 1, 13 (rev. ed., Oxford U. Press 1988) ("English lawyers
once distinguished between 'excusable' homicide (e.g. accidental non-negligent killing) and 'justifiable
homicide (e.g. killing in self-defence or in the arrest of a felon) and different legal consequences once
attached to these two forms of homicide. To the modern lawyer this distinction has no longer any legal
importance ....").
61. See Symposium, Justifications, Excuses, and Just Deserts, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1155 (1987);
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contemporary criminal theorists... ,,62 Although there were some noteworthy
63predecessors, Fletcher has been widely lauded for prophetically "[c]rying in the
wilderness''64 and resurrecting the distinction as a central concept in criminal
theory.65 While both defenses concede the definition of the offense has been
satisfied and both defenses, if successful, generate an acquittal, Fletcher
demonstrated the utility of the distinction by its ordering of legal rights and
relationships: "A valid justification, then, affects a matrix of legal relationships.
The victim [of justified force] has no right to resist, and other persons acquire a
right to assist .... Excuses, in contrast, do not affect legal relationships with other
persons [to resist or to assist the wrongful actor]." 66
Given the extraordinary influence Fletcher has enjoyed, it is not surprising
that four of the contributions herein focus primarily on justifications and excuses ,67
and three others do so in part.68  In "Rethinking Justifications, ' '69 R. A. Duff
argues that the categories of justification and excuse are insufficiently nuanced to
account for the rich variety of exculpatory claims. Drawing on the epistemological
meaning of justification, Duff discerns two separate strands of what justified
62. Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 491,491 (1989).
63. For examples of significant English-language discussions of the distinction prior to the
publication of Rethinking, see generally John L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Aristotelian Socy.
Procs. 1 (1956-57); Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 621 (1976); Hart, supra n.
60; Jerome Hall, Comment on Justification and Excuse, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 638 (1976) (commenting on
Eser, supra); Peter D.W. Heberling, Student Author, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code
on Statutory Reform, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 914 (1975); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification:
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266 (1975).
For Fletcher's own pre-Rethinking work on justification and excuse, see supra note 59.
64. Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897,
1897-98 (1984) ("Crying in the wilderness, however, are a few possibly prophetic voices, among which
the loudest and most eloquent is George Fletcher's.").
65. E.g. Joshua Dressier, Foreword: Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and
the Literature, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1155, 1159 (1987) ("George Fletcher is credited with 'crying in the
wilderness' about the lack of academic attention to the concepts of justification and excuse....
Professor Fletcher's scholarship has borne fruit. The field is now fairly rich in literature ....")
(quoting Greenawalt, supra n. 64, at 1897); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of
Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. Rev.
61, 63 (1984) ("George Fletcher is largely responsible for this modern interest [in the distinction].");
Eser, supra n. 63, at 621 ("with the exception of George Fletcher, who seems to stand alone in fully
recognizing the fundamental distinction"); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just
Convictions, 24 P. L.J. 1233, 1238 (1993) ("Much of the contemporary discussion of justification
defenses takes the form of a debate between George Fletcher and a series of critics ...."); A.T.H.
Smith, Rethinking the Defence of Mistake, 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 429, 430 (1982) ("[W]e can be grateful
to Fletcher for helping us to see the point [of the distinction] more clearly."); Glanville Williams, The
Theory of Excuses, 1982 Crim. L. Rev. 732, 732 ("We are indebted to Professor George Fletcher for
reviving interest in the distinction between justification and excuse in the criminal law." (footnote
omitted)).
66. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 762.
67. See Larry Alexander, Unknowingly Justified Actors and the Attempt/Success Distinction, 39
Tulsa L. Rev. 851 (2004); R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 829 (2004); Mordechai
Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggressor's Culpability in Self-Defense, 39
Tulsa L. Rev. 875 (2004); James Q. Whitman, Between Self-Defense and Vengeance/Between Social
Contract and Monopoly of Violence, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 901 (2004).
68. See Gardner, supra n. 49; Huigens, supra n. 11; Francisco Mufioz Conde, "Rethinking" the
Universal Structure of Criminal Law, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 941 (2004).
69. Duff, supra n. 67.
8
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conduct encompasses: right conduct and warranted conduct. 7 ° Duff then applies
this richer classificatory schema to two of the thorniest and most contested issues
among approaches to justification.
First, in the so-called problem of "putative justification,"'" theorists have
disagreed about whether an actor who reasonably believes in the existence of
justificatory circumstances, but is mistaken, should be justified or merely excused.
While Fletcher maintains that if an actor's conduct is, in fact, wrong it cannot be
justified and may only be excused, much of American law would treat the actor's
conduct as justified based on the reasonableness of the mistake.72 Duff contends
both approaches are wrong. To treat such an actor-who we might say does the
wrong deed for the right reason-as no less justified than an actor who does the
right deed for the right reason is to ignore significant differences between the two
types of actors.73 And to treat the reasonably mistaken actor as excused implies
that we would hope that she would do better the next time when presented with
the same situation.74 But this is false since she acted just as she should have-on
the basis of what reasonably appeared to be the case. 75  Rather than try to
awkwardly force the actor's defense into categories which do not fit, the actor's
conduct should be considered neither justified nor excused but rather wrong but
warranted.76
Second, in the problem of "unknown justification," theorists have disagreed
about whether an actor's conduct should be justified if the actor is unaware of
existing justificatory circumstances. While Fletcher here concurs with American
law by treating such an actor-who we might say did the right deed for the wrong
reason-as unjustified,77 other commentators argue that since the conduct is right
78it should be justified. Duff again concludes that the labels justified and
unjustified are inadequate and should be jettisoned in favor of the more nuanced
and suitable category of treating the actor's conduct as right, but unwarranted.7 9
While many contest attaching the label of justified to the mistakenly justified and
unknowingly justified actors above, few (if any) would dispute the labels "wrong
but unwarranted" and "right but unwarranted," respectively.. As a result, Duff
believes, this richer classificatory schema takes a significant step toward dissolving
these two problems.
In "Unknowingly Justified Actors and the Attempt/Success Distinction, 8 °
Larry Alexander also addresses the issue of unknowing justification by revisiting
70. Id. at 833-36.
71. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 762.
72. Id. at 762-69.
73. Duff, supra n. 67, at 839-40.
74. Id. at 840.
75. Id. at 840-41.
76. Id.
77. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 557.
78. See, for example, sources cited in Duff, supra n. 67, at 843 n. 42.
79. Duff, supra n. 67, at 843-44.
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its modern origin-a debate in 1975 between Fletcher and Paul Robinson, a
former star student of Fletcher. 8' Robinson's central argument is that the
unknowingly justified actor who commits "an act found to be beneficial, or at least
not harmful, should be of no concern to the criminal law.''82 Fletcher disagrees,
maintaining that unknowingly justified conduct should be unjustified.83 Fletcher
argues that Robinson's view conflates what must be considered as distinct: the
definition of the crime and justification. 84 In Rethinking, Fletcher utilizes the
offense/justification distinction to make two arguments against unknowing
justification. First, unlike offense prohibitions which require abstaining from
certain conduct, justificatory facts merely permit or privilege, but do not require,
certain conduct.85 Second, since justifications are exceptions to prohibitory norms,
an actor must merit the privilege to invoke the exception. To deserve to invoke
the exception one "must at least know of the circumstances supporting the claim
of an exception.,
86
Alexander argues that with respect to self-defense Fletcher is right, but with
respect to the lesser evils justification Robinson is right. This is because in many
self-defense cases the socially preferable course of action is unclear and self-
defense functions somewhat like an excuse.87  But where, as in lesser evils
situations, the socially preferable course of action is clear, we wish the actor to
perform the preferable course of action regardless of whether she is aware of the
justificatory circumstances.'
Alexander also notes that the unknowing justification issue bears on one of
the most intractable debates in criminal theory-whether consummated offenses
(for example, murder) deserve more punishment than inchoate offenses (for
example, attempted murder). This is but one aspect of the larger philosophical
problem of "moral luck." 89 That is, do actors deserve blame or praise for that
which is outside their control and a product, at least in part, of luck? Alexander
contends that careful consideration of the unknowing justification issue supports
attempts deserving the same punishment as completed offenses. 9
Taking the opposite position than Alexander, Jaime Malamud Goti, in
"Rethinking Punishment and Luck,"9' defends the position taken by Fletcher in
81. The debate took shape in an article by Paul Robinson and a reply article by Fletcher. See
generally Fletcher, Right Deed, supra n. 59; Robinson, supra n. 63.
82. Robinson, supra n. 63, at 267-68.
83. Fletcher, Right Deed, supra n. 59, at 320-21.
84. Id. at 309-10.
85. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 555-64.
86. Id. at 565.
87. Alexander, supra n. 67, at 855.
88. Id. at 856-57.
89. The term "moral luck" was perhaps first used by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams. See
Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions 24, 26 (Cambridge U. Press 1979); Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, at 20 (Cambridge U. Press 1981). Nagel,
however, credits Williams with coining the term. Thomas Nagel, Other Minds 167 (Oxford U. Press
1995).
90. Alexander, supra n. 67, at 857-58.
91. Jaime Malamud Goti, Rethinking Punishment and Luck, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 861 (2004).
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Rethinking that consummate offenses deserve greater punishment than inchoate
offenses. Fletcher frames the issue as whether an "act of wrongdoing is
aggravated by the occurrence of a harmful consequence. ' '92 After rejecting a
number of arguments supporting greater deserved punishment for consummated
offenses, Fletcher tentatively advances an argument based on an actor's greater
feelings of remorse and guilt for causing a harm than for merely risking or
intending a harm. For example, "[i]f an assassin aims, shoots and hits her intended
victim, she is likely to feel different about her act than she would if the bullet had
gone astray."93  From this insight Fletcher reasons that if we were "to ask
ourselves whether if we were to be punished the same for culpably causing harm
and for having a 'close call,' we would regard ourselves as justly treated., 94
Fletcher assumes not and thus, "we can hardly defend treating others in a way that
we would not regard as acceptable." 95
Malamud Goti argues that if the only component of deserved punishment is
that which is outside the realm of luck, there would be virtually nothing left upon
which to justify punishment at all. Not only are the outcomes of our actions
beyond our control, but so also are our very acts themselves. 96 For example, "we
cannot fully trust our muscles, for they may fail to obey us when we command
them to stretch and contract."97 As a result, deserved punishment cannot be
imposed based on our actions. Next Malamud Goti contends even our beliefs,
thoughts, and mental processes are beyond our control and subject to the
influence of luck. "The meaning and validity of a great deal of our mental activity
depends on other people's beliefs and attitudes which, in turn, these individuals
cannot themselves control." 98 With consequences of actions, actions themselves,
and even thoughts outside of our control, there is nothing left upon which to base
deserved punishment." Thus, the stringent requirement that luck be morally
irrelevant is simply too unrealistic to support any institution of punishment or
practice of blaming. Building on this argument, Malamud Goti forges some
interesting connections to the issues encompassing present group responsibility for
the actions of past members of those groups.1°° With particular emphasis on the
viability of reparations to African Americans to redress the continuing injustices
of the vestiges of slavery, Malamud Goti argues for the centrality of a robust
conception of blame and the admission of responsibility. °1
Returning again to issues of justification and excuse, the next two
contributions both address-albeit from different perspectives-perhaps the most
92. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 475.
93. Id. at 482.
94. Id. at 483.
95. Id.
96. Malamud Goti, supra n. 91, at 866.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 867.
99. Id. at 869.
100. Id. at 869-72.
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discussed exculpatory claim-self-defense. While Mordechai Kremnitzer and
Khalid Ghanayim explore self-defense in the methodological vein of Rethinking,
James Whitman's essay considers self-defense within a framework of political
theory-a perspective that Fletcher will increasingly draw on in his forthcoming
sequel to Rethinking.'02
In "Proportionality and the Aggressor's Culpability in Self-Defense,"'' 3
Kremnitzer and Ghanayim dispute Fletcher's model of self-defense which
excludes the requirements of proportional force and the aggressor's culpability.
Rethinking canvasses three different models of self-defense: (i) as an excuse, (ii) as
a variant on lesser evils or necessity in which the aggressor's culpability is included
in the calculus of proportional harms, and (iii) protection of the victim's
autonomy. °4 Fletcher adopts the latter model after considering the example of a
man in an elevator who prevents an attack by a knife-wielding psychotic by killing
him (which was the only means of escaping serious bodily harm).,05 Fletcher
rejects the model of self-defense as excuse because that would allow the psychotic
a right to defend against the defender's force.'06 The necessity model is also
inapplicable because proportionality is not satisfied. The harm avoided is not
(significantly) greater than that caused-it is taking one nonculpable (because
psychotic) life to save one nonculpable (because nonaggressing) life.'0 7 The only
remaining model that grants the defender a satisfactory right of self-defense is
protection of autonomy. As Fletcher explains the protection of autonomy model,
"the aggressor's culpability appears to be irrelevant; what counts is the objective
nature of the aggressor's intrusion."'0 8 Proportionality is also irrelevant: "any
person attacked by another should have the absolute right to counteract
aggression against his vital interests."'0 9
Kremnitzer and Ghanayim argue that Fletcher is mistaken and that self-
defense as modeled on necessity is the preferable approach. Under the necessity
model, a wide variety of interests and considerations may be relevant to the
balancing of harm avoided versus harm committed."0  One such interest is the
autonomy of the defender which the psychotic has infringed."' Consideration of
the defender's autonomy alters the balance in favor of the defender such that the
defender's force avoids greater harm than it inflicts-loss of defender's life and
violation of defender's autonomy is avoided at the cost of the psychotic
aggressor's life." 2 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim conclude that the necessity-based
102. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 992 ("[P]olitical analysis must precede any reference to moral issues....
Morality becomes relevant in the theory of law only because a political theory makes it relevant.").
103. Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra n. 67.
104. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 855-64.
105. Fletcher, Proportionality, supra n. 59, at 371.
106. Id. at 376.
107. Id. at 374-76.
108. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 862.
109. Id. at 860.
110. Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra n. 67, at 877-79.
111. Id. at 877-81.
112. Id. at 880-81.
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model is preferable by providing a justification to the defender against the
psychotic aggressor while still preserving the relevance of, as requirements for
justified self-defense, proportional force and the culpability of an aggressor.
The next grouping of contributions marks a departure from the vein of
Rethinking, but anticipates the perspectives and concerns of Fletcher's
forthcoming Internationalizing Criminal Law. James Whitman's and Victoria
Nourse's essays reflect Fletcher's increased emphasis on a broader political
framework from which to view issues of criminal justice. Francisco Mufioz
Conde's and Albin Eser's essays focus on substantive and procedural aspects,
respectively, of the burgeoning field of international criminal law.
In "Between Self-Defense and Vengeance/Between Social Contract and
Monopoly of Violence,. 13 Whitman critiques the criminal law's inadequate
treatment of justification and excuse claims, with particular respect to self-defense,
through the lens of political theory. The inadequacy, Whitman argues, stems from
the "tension between self-defense and vengeance. 114 While our criminal law
recognizes that citizens have a right of self-preservation, it formally disavows the
legitimacy of vengeance. But too many defendants use force motivated by
vengeance and then subsequently seek to cloak their conduct in the garb of a right
to self-preservation.1 5 Perhaps sensing that vengeance is, in some respects, a
greater part of justice than our criminal law is willing to acknowledge, the criminal
justice system then either attempts to force impermissible vengeance-motivated
conduct into an existing acceptable self-preservation category or awkwardly
evolves new doctrines to exculpate such conduct.1 6 The natural results of this
tension between official disavowal of vengeance and unofficial, tacit condonation
are disingenuous and distorted theories of justification and excuse and "a criminal
law that ties itself into ungainly doctrinal knots.'. 7
And this tension in doctrinal criminal law is mirrored in political theory by
the contrast between two leading theories of the state-social contract theory and
monopoly of violence theory. 8 While sometimes treated as the same, Whitman
delineates an important difference. The social contract theory justifies state
coercion from the premise that one's natural right to self-defense is surrendered to
the state in return for the state supplying collective self-defense." 9 In contrast, the
monopoly of violence theory is premised on a citizen surrendering a natural right
to seek vengeance in return for the state exacting vengeance on behalf of its
aggrieved citizens.120 After canvassing a number of historical and contemporary
examples, including the present war in Iraq, Whitman conjectures that,
unfortunately, human nature and political reality may reflect the primacy of the
113. Whitman, supra n. 67.
114. Id. at 902.
115. Id. at 903-09.
116. Id. at 904-08.
117. Id. at 908 (footnote omitted).
118. Whitman, supra n. 67, at 902.





Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003
TULSA LAW REVIEW
desire for vengeance. 12' As a result, to avoid the mismatch between doctrine and
reality, both our criminal law and our political theory may well have to
increasingly encompass a paradigm of social vengeance.
12 2
In "Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, '2  Victoria
Nourse draws inspiration from Rethinking in two ways. First, it refused to
abandon criminal law to the narrow, doctrinal, Model Penal Code-dominated
zeitgeist of the 1950s through 1970s. Instead, Rethinking imbued new life into the
field with its richly multi-disciplinary approach of comparative law, history, moral
philosophy, and political philosophy. Second, and more specifically, while noting
that Rethinking primarily focused on the moral philosophy component, 24 Nourse
finds inspiration in Rethinking's validation of the central importance of political
theory to criminal law. As Nourse maintains, "[t]he criminal law... is about the
nature of government itself.'' 125 But for Nourse this political dimension to criminal
law should include not merely political theory but political practice as well.
12 6
As but a part of her larger project of "'rethinking' criminal law as it reflects
the history of political theory," 127 Nourse's essay takes a preliminary stab at "the
politics of crime legislation.' ' 28 With particular emphasis on the recidivist statutes,
or "three strikes laws," Nourse subverts the prevailing assumption of legal
historians that the "get tough on crime" attitudes and rhetoric began and were
continued only in the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations.1 29 Rather, wars
on crime have been waged throughout the twentieth century and have cut across
partisan lines. After canvassing the interactions of popular perceptions of crime
and their concomitant legislative responses (and most interestingly, vice versa130 ),
Nourse demonstrates that the much-debated, recent harshness of our criminal
justice system has been endemic throughout, at least, the twentieth century. 3 ' As
a result, Nourse suggests, the harshness may be integral to, and exacerbated by,
the very political structures which we, as Americans, both cherish and use to
define us. 132 If so, Nourse concludes, understanding the failures of the last century
in dealing with the seemingly insoluble problems of criminal justice should
galvanize us to rethink our assumptions and begin anew in the criminal law in a
framework in which the criminal law is truly a species of not only political theory
but political practice as well.
33
121. Id. at 915-19.
122. Id. at 921-23.
123. Nourse, supra n. 11.
124. Id. at 928 n. 13.
125. Id. at 934 (emphasis omitted).
126. Id. at 928.
127. Id.
128. Nourse, supra n. 11, at 928.
129. Id. at 928-30.
130. Id. at 926.
131. Id. at 928-34.
132 Id. at 934-36.
133. Nourse, supra n. 11, at 935-37.
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In "'Rethinking' The Universal Structure of Criminal Law,"'' 34 Francisco
Mufioz Conde investigates the possibility of identifying a shared conceptual
framework of criminal law that would meet the growing need for an
internationalized, globalized, and universalized criminal law. Mufioz Conde
attempts to find the basic concepts for such a shared framework in Rethinking
which, as Mufioz Conde notes, is itself an attempt to mediate between common
law and continental approaches to criminal law. In finding the deep grammar and
structures of criminal law common to all the disparate national and parochial
systems of criminal law, Mufioz Conde uses Rethinking not only as a source for
such deep structures but also as a counterpoint to the current trends in criminal
law. The basic concepts Mufioz Conde discusses, which any universalized criminal
law must address, include whether an actor's wrongdoing and harmful
consequences should take primacy over an actor's intention;135 the interplay of
inchoate offenses such as possession of illicit substances and reckless
endangerment and mistakes of fact and law, and the challenge this interplay poses
to the operation of a strict legality principle; 3 6 and the distinction between
justification and excuse."'
While Mufioz Conde's contribution stresses the importance of a
universalized substantive criminal law, Albin Eser, in "For Universal Jurisdiction:
Against Fletcher's Antagonism,' 138 defends perhaps the most crucial procedural
aspect of a universalized criminal law-universal jurisdiction. Eser offers a point-
by-point rebuttal of Fletcher's withering critique of universal jurisdiction.
Fletcher attacks the increasing trend of many countries, including Belgium,
Canada, and Germany, to assert universal jurisdiction over the adjudication of
crimes committed anywhere in the world even if neither the accused nor the
victim has any tie to that country.139 Though Fletcher characterizes those favoring
universal jurisdiction as "compassionate, 'right-thinking' lawyers,' ' 40 Fletcher
concludes that "universal jurisdiction is both unwise and unjust.' 14  Eser replies
that the concept of universal jurisdiction has been recognized since 1927 and has
afforded the prosecution of many infamous criminals-the Nuremberg trials of
Nazi war criminals and the Israeli prosecution of Adolf Eichmann1 42 Against
Fletcher's concern that universal jurisdiction promotes interjurisdictional conflicts,
Eser explains that even under territorial jurisdiction concurrent national and
international jurisdiction may result if a crime occurred across a number of
134. Mufioz Conde, supra n. 68.
135. Id. at 944-46.
136. Id. at 946-51.
137. Id. at 951-53.
138. Albin Eser, For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 955
(2004).
139. George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. Intl. Crim. J. 580 (2003).
140. Id. at 580.
141. Id.
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countries. 14  Against Fletcher's criticism that the circumstances under which a
prosecution under universal jurisdiction takes place will be unjust and unfair by
tending to favor the victims at the expense of the accused, Eser argues that
fairness is owed not only to the accused but to victims as well.
144
Eser also disputes that the rights of the accused will be weaker under
universal jurisdiction prosecutions than in American prosecutions. According to
Fletcher, the possibility of multiple prosecutions under universal jurisdiction
would violate the American constitutional right against double jeopardy.145
Though Eser concedes this prospect as potentially troubling, he argues that even
without universal jurisdiction this difficulty may arise. 46 And furthermore, Eser
notes, the vaunted American protection against double jeopardy is not without its
exceptions-the dual sovereignty doctrine, minor variations in different offenses
allow for multiple prosecutions of essentially the same conduct, and successive
prosecutions after a mistrial or if an acquittal resulted from fraud or collusion. 47
And finally, in "From Rethinking to Internationalizing Criminal Law," 
48
George Fletcher treats us to a fascinating intellectual memoir tracing the
evolution of his thinking and rethinking about criminal law from the advent of
Rethinking through a number of other stages and progressing to the forthcoming
stage of his sequel to Rethinking-a synthesis of criminal theory, comparative
criminal law, and international criminal law. After recounting the origins of, and
the influences on, the unconventional approach taken in Rethinking, Fletcher
summarizes the core of Rethinking by explaining its opposition to eight positions
taken by the Model Penal Code. 149 Though at the time of writing Rethinking
Fletcher reveals that he was aware that the project was a "gamble" and exhibited
considerable "chutzpah,"' 50 viewing it retrospectively Fletcher now intriguingly
characterizes it as "conservative and traditional."15 ' In mounting his normative or
nonconsequentialist critique of the criminal law of the common law, Fletcher
employed a combination of analytic and ordinary language philosophy as well as
post-WWII German criminal theory.5 2  In contrast, the Bentham-influenced
utilitarian approach of the Model Penal Code "could subject the common law to a
[comparatively more] systematic critique.' ' 153  Fletcher now sees that
143. Id. at 957-58.
144. Id. at 959-60.
145. Fletcher, supra n. 139, at 580-83.
146. Eser provides the following example:
If... a German terrorist bombed an American tour bus in Madrid and fled to Paris, why
should not each of the countries concerned attempt to get the perpetrator extradited: to
Spain based on the territory of commission, to Germany based on the nationality of the
defendant, or to the United States based on the nationality of the victims?
Eser, supa n. 138, at 965.
147. Id. at 966-68.
148. Fletcher, supra n. 11.
149. Id. at 979-85.
150. Id. at 979.
151. Id. at 984.
15Z Id.
153. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 984.
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"[p]aradoxically, Herb Wechsler and the MPC adopted a more radically critical
point of view than [his] own.,
15 4
As perhaps the first book on comparative criminal theory, Rethinking found
an appreciative audience both at home and abroad. Europeans read it as an
explanation of the common law in a conceptual framework they could
understand-Continental legal thought. American readers saw, perhaps for the
first time, that criminal theory (treating the criminal law as "a species of political
and moral philosophy, 155) was a valuable enterprise and that our understanding of
criminal law could be enhanced by a comparative perspective.
After Rethinking, Fletcher published a number of books concerning related
themes. In A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial,15 6 on
the trial of infamous subway vigilante Bernhard Goetz, Fletcher "sought to
describe the ideas set forth in Rethinking to a general audience. 1 57 As Paul
Robinson quipped, it was "Rethinking in short pants., 158 From the discussion of
the crime of treason in his next book, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of
Relationships,5 9 Fletcher realized that treason might be a separate, and fourth,
pattern of liability supplementing the three identified in Rethinking.'60 While the
wrong of other core crimes is "universal in nature," treason is parochial-"wrong
only from the standpoint of the state that is betrayed., 161 With Justice for Some:
Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials,162 focusing on recent, high-profile criminal
trails, addressed the side of the criminal trial ignored by Rethinking-victims and
victims' rights. This anticipated the Rome Statute's stunning conceptual shift of
emphasizing the rights of victims perhaps above those of defendants.13 Around
1995, Fletcher began to take tentative steps toward a second edition of Rethinking.
A prelude was the publication of Basic Concepts of Criminal Law,164 offering an
account of the criminal law in twelve basic distinctions. This was the beginning of
Fletcher's attempt at a "universal theory" or "universal grammar" of criminal
law.1
65
As Fletcher began to work on drafts of a sequel to Rethinking, tentatively
titled "Universalizing Criminal Law," explicating the set of philosophical premises
of universal application that underpin the criminal law, transformative world
154. Id.
155. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at xix.
156. George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial (Free Press
1988).
157. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 986.
158. Id. (citing Paul H. Robinson, Books for Lawyers: Revenge of the Nerd, 74 ABA J. 112 (Sept. 1,
1988) (reviewing Fletcher, supra n. 156)).
159. George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (Oxford U. Press 1993).
160. For discussion of Fletcher's three patterns of criminality, see supra notes 14-25 and
accompanying text.
161. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 987.
162. George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials (Addison Wesley
Publg. 1995).
163. Fletcher, supra n. 11, at 988.
164. George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford U. Press 1998).
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events were causing the criminal law to undergo radical change.' 66 The ad hoc
tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the terrorist attacks of September
11, and the Rome Statute coming into force in July of 2002 also crystallized the
focus and scope of a sequel to Rethinking.167 In the wake of these events, Fletcher
realized that while international criminal law prosecutions needed a fusion of
common law and continental principles, the field of international criminal law
required an infusion of comparative and theoretical criminal law scholarship.
With the mission of the book clarified-a synthesis of theoretical, comparative,
and international criminal law-Fletcher is finally writing the long-awaited sequel
to Rethinking. While the dizzying pace of change in the world makes difficult to
predict what our criminal law will look like twenty-five years hence, undoubtedly
this brave new world of criminal law will still be studying, arguing over, and
honoring both Rethinking and its new sibling, Internationalizing Criminal Law.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 990.
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